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A GENDERED REFUTATION OF EPIPHENOMENAL NORMS
THROUGH THE MEDIAN VOTER: A CASE STUDY OF
INDIA’S CEDAW COMPLIANCE
Shritha Vasudevan∗
ABSTRACT
This Article hypothesizes on the reasons behind India’s Declaration to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) Article 5(a) as a manifestation of the intensive compliance deadlock
over its due diligence obligation which castigates traditional, cultural attitudes
as responsible for gender-based violence.
A qualitative analysis of two historical moments when India was confronted
with an empirical conflict of the CEDAW’s due diligence obligation: the sati of
Roop Kanwar in 1987 and the Shah Bano judgment in 1985, even prior to its
CEDAW accession in 1993 is undertaken, to argue that the rational choice
theory of voting and elections perfectly explains non-compliance. This article
contests the position that norms are epiphenomenal and makes the case that only
a study of gendered compliance alters the epistemological lens. This finding
implies norms could be rationally restructured to make it in nations’ interest to
comply, simultaneously contesting the post-positivist feminist IR contention that
eschews the relevance of the mainstream discipline.

∗
Shritha Vasudevan is currently a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Florida, Gainesville, United States. She studies the nature of India’s CEDAW compliance
primarily through investigating the relationship between the Hindu Personal Laws and gender-based violence in
Indian society. She holds a B.A.B.L. (Hons.) from the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research,
University of Law, India; an LLM from the University of Illinois, Urbana, United States; an MA in Women and
Gender Studies, University of Louisville, Kentucky, United States; and an MA in International Relations from
the University of Chicago, Illinois, United States.

VASUDEVANPROOFS

224

4/1/2019 2:27 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 225
I. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF RATIONAL CHOICE .................... 234
A. Contesting the Epiphenomenal Thesis ...................................... 237
II. THE MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM ......................................................... 238
III. HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................................... 243
A. Research Methodology ............................................................. 244
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE MEDIAN VOTER
IN INDIA? ........................................................................................... 245
A. The Intersubjective Patriarchal, Religious Atmosphere That
Primed the Sati of Roop ............................................................ 245
B. The Shah Bano Judgment ......................................................... 253
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 255

VASUDEVANPROOFS

2019]

4/1/2019 2:27 PM

INDIA’S CEDAW COMPLIANCE

225

INTRODUCTION
One of the most seriously under-theorized and understudied aspect of
international relations is the set of reasons behind the massive number of
reservations and declarations to the one of the few existing international legal
principle on gender-based violence (GBV) known as the due diligence
obligation to the CEDAW. The due diligence obligation was formulated in
response to the widespread crimes of GBV during the Balkan conflict in 1992,
which provided the historical imperative to force the agenda for a right against
GBV onto the international stage.1
The promulgation of an international legal principle on GBV has been
hindered by the massive number of reservations and declarations advanced by
nation-states. The process of promulgating an international legal principle on
GBV at the inception of the CEDAW has been termed the biggest deadlock in
the history of the human rights system.2 When the CEDAW was drafted and
subsequently promulgated at the United Nations in 1979, governments
unilaterally invoked their rights under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties3 to unequivocally reiterate that the right against GBV could not prevail
when it conflicted with the right to freedom of religion.4 The number of
1
The term “due diligence” in this Article refers exclusively to the CEDAW’s due diligence obligation
incorporated by way of a General Recommendation of the CEDAW treaty in 1992. It should be noted that this
principle has not yet been codified into formal international law, making the present study still one of
international norms. This distinction is made in order to prevent a reference to the other principle of due diligence
under public international law—the due diligence obligation of states with regard to the jus cogens right against
torture. The due diligence obligation to the CEDAW has borrowed from the concept of the due diligence against
torture and has evolved a gendered interpretation of this right stating that states have a duty to prosecute, punish,
and prevent violence against women, which may be characterized as torture in the private sphere. The text of the
CEDAW’s due diligence obligation can be accessed at: G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (Dec. 18, 1979).
2
Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of CEDAW’s Reservation Regime under
Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 605, 605 (2002).
3
Pamela Goldberg & Nancy Kelly, International Human Rights and Violence Against Women, 6 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 195 (1993); Michele Brandt & Jeffrey A. Kaplan, The Tension Between Women’s Rights and
Religious Rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J. L. & RELIGION 106, 107–
08 (1995); See J. ANN TICKNER, GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURITY 18–19 (John Gerard Ruggie & Helen Milner eds., 1992); Riddle, supra note 2.
4
The Reservations and Declarations to the CEDAW are available at: Rep. of U.N. Meeting of States
Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination against Women, Sixteenth meeting,
Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations Relating to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, at 11–12, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/SP/2010/2 (Mar. 1, 2010) [hereafter U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2010/2]. Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Brunei, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Malta, Micronesia,
Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab
Emirates have entered Reservations on the conflict of rights frame between religion and gender-based
discrimination. Id. at 5–28.
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reservations to the CEDAW on this ground is the largest to any human rights
treaty,5 reiterating the charge of scholars of human rights compliance that norms
are indeed epiphenomenal to international life.6
This Article argues that this international deadlock that impeded the
adoption of a principle on GBV in 1979, when the CEDAW was drafted,7
resurrected itself in 1992 as a legal obstacle when the due diligence was
promulgated. Governments have refused to support an international legal
principle that blatantly asks them to interfere in the religious practices that cause
GBV precisely because the principle conflicts with the right to freedom of
religion.8 The due diligence obligation has not yet been codified into a formal
principle of public international law because of this trenchant opposition.9 This
is the only existing international legal principle that unequivocally states that
traditional, cultural attitudes emanating from religious practices that cause GBV
cannot be condoned. The due diligence is thus based on a conflict of rights
framework—the right to freedom of religion and the right against GBV.10 It is
based on a liberal conceptualization of the relationship between the right to
equality and the right against GBV, which does not permit a normative
determination of the hierarchy between these norms.11 The lack of a normative
hierarchy has permitted the deadlock to compliance with this principle at the
international level. This Article submits that nation-states have utilized this
absence of a normative hierarchy to advance reservations against implementing
the only existing international norm on GBV.
As stated above, this international deadlock with regard to compliance is the
longest witnessed to any treaty on human rights.12 Yet, the causes have not been
seriously investigated, simultaneously reaffirming the charge by feminist
International Relations (IR) theorists that gender is accorded scant priority by

5
Julie A. Minor, Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 137, 144 (1994).
6
The role of the epiphenomenal contention as the primary explanation for non-compliance with the
principles of human rights law will be explained in the next section.
7
Charlotte Bunch, Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 HUM.
RTS. Q. 486, 495 (1990); see Radhika Coomaraswamy, Reinventing International Law: Women’s Rights as
Human Rights in the International Community, 23 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL., 1249, 1250 (1997).
8
Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict
Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 795, 807 (1992).
9
Ronagh J. A. McQuigg, Is it Time for a UN Treaty on Violence Against Women?, 22 INT’L. J. HUM.
RTS. 305, 318–19 (2018); Sullivan, supra note 8, at 796–98.
10
Sullivan, supra note 8, at 814.
11
Id. at 796.
12
Riddle, supra note 2, at 606.
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the mainstream discipline of IR.13 One of the principal arguments of feminist IR
theorists first made in 1987 was that the realm of international relations was
patriarchal, male, and incapable of realizing the interests of women.14 This state
of affairs contributed to insufficient theorizing of gender within the paradigms
of the IR discipline. Hence, this strand of feminist IR theorization, as applicable
to the present argument, will contend that the insufficient theorization on the
numerous reservations to the CEDAW, and subsequently its due diligence
principle, is a reflection of the patriarchal realm of IR.
This Article stands as stark testimony to the fact that a proper analysis along
a gender axis can reveal the principles on which the relationships between
nation-states are structured. This Article contends that only this approach
enables discernment of the conditions that cause or preclude compliance with
human rights norms. The standard contention by human rights scholars—that
non-compliance is generated because the due diligence norm and the norm
privileging the right to gender-based equality over the right to freedom of
religion is epiphenomenal—will be contested on the basis of the median voter
theorem. The median voter theorem states that politicians prefer the position
held by the average voter. This Article argues that the Indian Government’s
Declaration to the CEDAW was based on its perception of the median voter in
India. This perception is hypothesized to be male, Hindu patriarchal and firmly
in favor of the Hindu religious attitudes that cause GBV. An examination of the
empirical occurrence of the due diligence obligation in India during the sati of
Roop Kanwar and the parliamentary reversal of Shah Bano is used to make this
case. As a result, this Article demonstrates the relevance of gender analysis to
theorization on the relationship between nation-states. Non-compliance with
human rights norms ensues not because nations consider norms to be
epiphenomenal. In this significant instance of India’s compliance with the
CEDAW, the evidence indicates unequivocally that the median voter precludes
India’s compliance with a principle requiring affirmative state action to redress
the traditional religious attitudes that cause GBV. Therefore, the empirical
evidence in this Article indicates that the Indian government’s non-compliance
with the due diligence obligation is motivated by concerns about its median
voter, which all governments and politicians unequivocally seek to please rather
than a perception that the due diligence obligation is epiphenomenal. This

13
J. ANN TICKNER, GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING
GLOBAL SECURITY 18–19 (John Gerard Ruggie & Helen Milner eds., 1992).
14
Id. at 6, 10; Susanne Zwingel, How Do International Women’s Rights Norms Become Effective in
Domestic Contexts? An Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ruhr University Bochum) (on file with author).
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surely, then, contests the primary argument of the human rights compliance
literature that norms are epiphenomenal.
Further, this Article demonstrates the validity of evolving testable
hypotheses on gender proposed by Keohane15 and partially contests the postpositivist feminist IR contention16 that the mainstream discipline of IR has
nothing to offer to resolve the situation of gendered oppression. An ancillary
effect of the feminist IR contention—that the system of IR is incapable of
representing the interests of women—is that the system of IR is indeed irrelevant
to the resolution of the situation of gendered oppression. But, this Article argues
that the mainstream discipline of political science through its median voter
theorem has provided the keys to unlock the puzzle of compliance with the due
diligence principle, the most contested principle of the human rights treaty
system. This finding is important, particularly to address gendered oppression in
developing nations where pervasive cultural practices can be linked to GBV,
such as with a specific cultural practice of the majority Hindu religion in India.17
Only the liberal sphere, and particularly the instruments of public international
law, provide an important analytical and substantive tool of redress. The feminist
IR theorists’ contention that the sphere of IR is irrelevant to the situation of
gendered oppression negates the validity and relevance of the instruments of
public international law like the CEDAW that have been valiantly used by
feminist activists to construct an alternative discourse on the rights of genderbased equality in countries like India.18 Hence, this Article is also a trenchant
call to the discipline of feminist IR to reformulate its primary proposition to
account for an immanent critique of IR. On the basis of a developing nation’s
experience, the mainstream discipline of IR is indeed relevant to gender.
To demonstrate the paradigmatic relevance of gender to the discipline of IR,
the factors precluding compliance with the CEDAW’s due diligence obligation
will be studied on the basis of the gendered experience in arguably the most
dangerous country for women: India.19 The rationale for this case selection is to

15
Robert O. Keohane, Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations and Feminist
Theory, 42 INT’L STUD. Q. 193 (1998); Zwingel, supra note 14 at 21.
16
Laura Sjoberg, Introduction to Security Studies: Feminist Contributions, 18 SECURITY STUD. 183, 205
(2009).
17
One specific cultural manifestation of this practice that is considered by the current Article is the sati
of Roop Kanwar, who was just 18-year-old and a bride for six months when she was forcibly immolated on the
funeral pyre of her husband, Maan Singh.
18
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality Under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects, and
“Personal Laws”, 4 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 181 (2006).
19
A global study ranked India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia in the same tier and amongst the worst
places to be a woman. This study noted the status of India vis-à-vis “surprise.” By demonstrating that the worst

VASUDEVANPROOFS

2019]

4/1/2019 2:27 PM

INDIA’S CEDAW COMPLIANCE

229

understand the reasons causing GBV in a society and civilization that have been
suffering from intense forms of GBV since 1000 CE. Rather than deploy a
comparative cross-national analysis, this Article uses the gendered experience
of a single country as a heuristic for some of the worst forms of GBV. Also, a
study of the factors precluding compliance with the due diligence principle in a
country suffering and witnessing some of the worst manifestations of GBV
hopefully will bring heightened international attention to its nature and
intensity.20 For the sati of an 18-year-old girl on the funeral pyre of her 21-yearold husband is now hopelessly lost in the dusty annals of Indian history.21
Through the examination of non-adherence to the CEDAW’s due diligence
principle, this Article revisits her last moments and hopes to invoke her memory
to set into motion the complex process of redressing GBV in Indian society.
The nature of CEDAW compliance will be examined through the
immolation of an 18-year-old girl, Roop Kanwar, on the funeral pyre of her
husband in 1987, in the village of Deeorala, in the north-western state of
Rajasthan in India, and the Parliamentary reversal in 1985 of the Shah Bano
judgment by the Supreme Court of India. The latter is a significant moment of
GBV when a Supreme Court judgment that granted a marginal alimony to a 72year-old divorcée was retracted by the liberal, democratic Indian Parliament.22
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of India has recently held Triple Talaq
to be “void, illegal[,] and ‘unconstitutional,”‘23 the Shah Bano Judgment (taken
in conjunction with Roop Kanwar’s sati in 1987) is structured on the conflict of
rights frame of the due diligence obligation.24 The nature and pervasiveness of
position of woman is actually the median voter preference this article negates the construct of surprise by
empirical social scientific evidence. See Press Trust of India, India Slips 21 Slots on WEF Gender Gap Index
2017, HINDU (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-slips-21-slots-occupy-108th-rankon-wef-gender-gap-index-2017/article19966894.ece; see also Belinda Goldsmith & Meka Beresford, Poll Ranks
India the World’s Most Dangerous Country for Women, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2018), http://www.theguardian.
com/global-development/2018/jun/28/poll-ranks-india-most-dangerous-country-for-women.
20
Belinda Goldsmith & Meka Beresford, Poll Ranks India the World’s Most Dangerous Country for
Women, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2018), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/28/poll-ranksindia-most-dangerous-country-for-women.
21
Sati refers to the ancient Hindu practice of burning a widow alive on the funeral pyre along with her
husband’s corpse. This is prescribed in the Hindu religious texts and was routinely carried out in some parts of
the Indian subcontinent for at least 4000 years. See Dorothy K. Stein, Women to Burn: Suttee as a Normative
Institution, 4 SIGNS 253, 255 (1978), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3173024.
22
Zoya Hasan, Minority Identity, Muslim Women Bill Campaign and the Political Process, 24 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 44, 44 (1989).
23
Supreme Court Bars Triple Talaq for Six Months. Here’s a 11-Point Primer, ECON. TIMES (Aug. 22,
2017),
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/supreme-court-bars-triple-talaq-tillparliament-makes-a-law-heres-a-11-point-primer/articleshow/60169892.cms.
24
Nawaz B. Mody, The Press in India: The Shah Bano Judgment and Its Aftermath, 27 ASIAN SURV.
935, 937 (1987).
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GBV in Indian society, makes it important to understand the factors precluding
compliance with the due diligence obligation to the CEDAW. These two
moments unveiled a tension between the right to freedom of religion and the
right against GBV and provided clues to understand the nature of India’s
Declaration to the CEDAW’s due diligence in 1993. Hence, the passage of the
current Supreme Court Judgment does not denude the Shah Bano Judgment of
its empirical validity vis-à-vis India’s CEDAW compliance.
It is the submission of this Article that if the Indian government chose the
right to freedom of religion in both these instances over the right against GBV,
then its subsequent behavior in 1993 during CEDAW accession privileging the
right to freedom of religion can be stated to be a reflection of its prior behavior.
Despite the fact that these two moments are situated immediately prior to India’s
CEDAW accession, they are historically fortuitous occurrences of the conflict
of rights of the due diligence obligation permitting reasonable inferences on the
nature of India’s CEDAW compliance. The due diligence obligation is
jurisprudentially based on a conflict between the right to freedom of religion and
the right against GBV.25 The liberal international sphere does not provide for a
normative determination of the superiority of either norm. In other words,
religious practices that cause GBV are not deemed problematic under the liberal
paradigm of international law. This is as the liberal sphere permits the right to
freedom of religion to co-exist with the right to gender-based equality and the
right against GBV.
Methodologically, this Article specifically locates the factors precluding
compliance in these two moments through the median voter theorem,
demonstrating their paradigmatic relevance in the present-day context. Hence,
this Article departs significantly, for reasons explained in the next section, from
other studies on CEDAW compliance that only study the trajectory of
compliance after its occurrence. The historical experiences of nations prior to
compliance matter immensely to understand the true causes behind compliance.
This Article contends that India’s Declaration to CEDAW’s Article 5(a) is a
derogation of the due diligence obligation that has been recognized as a principle
emanating from jus cogens principle of public international law.26 There exists
25

Sullivan, supra note 8, at 796.
E.g., David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus
Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 225, 246 (2005); Yakin Erturk (Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences), 15 Years of United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences (1994–2009) – A Critical Review, ¶ 66,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/6/Add.5 (May 27, 2009); accord Felice D. Gaer, Rape as a Form of Torture: The
Experience of the Committee Against Torture, 15 CUNY L. REV. 293 (2012); see Indira Jaising, The Convention
26
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a stream of legal consciousness that the due diligence principle is actually a
precept of customary international law since it inter alia emanates from the jus
cogens right against torture.27 It can be conceptualized as a non-derogable norm
under the canons of public international law. India acceded to the CEDAW in
1993 with a Declaration to Article 5, which calls on states to “modify the cultural
practices of men and women and eliminate all customary practices”28 claiming
that it will implement this principle only to the extent that it does not require
modification or interference in the religious laws of its minority communities.29
India is governed by personal status laws on inheritance, succession,
guardianship, and custody, which discriminate against women.30 A formal link
between the practices of GBV and the personal status laws has not been
established. Feminist scholar Parashar contends that one of the principal
fallacies of the feminist victory in securing a legislation against domestic
violence in India in 2008 was that it failed to account for the patriarchal religious
practices reflected in its personal status laws that cause violence.31 The
legislation merely retained the right of women suffering from GBV to remain in
their matrimonial homes.32 In other words, this Article argues that Parashar’s
argument can be restated as follows: the implicit connection between the Hindu
Personal Laws and the institutions of GBV did not figure in the remedy obtained
in the domestic violence legislation.
This Article attempts to craft a feminist voice that demonstrates the intrinsic
links between the Hindu Personal Laws and the institutions of GBV in India. It
does so by demonstrating that India’s CEDAW Declaration, structured in terms
of protecting the Personal Laws of its religious minorities, indirectly protects
and promotes those majoritarian Hindu cultural traditions that cause violence. In
effect, there exists empirical interconnections between the patriarchal, cultural
traditions that cause GBV in Hindu society and the religious norms of gender
subordination codified in the Hindu Personal Laws.

on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and Realisation of Rights:
Reflections on Standard Settings and Culture, in WITHOUT PREJUDICE: CEDAW AND THE DETERMINATION OF
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN A LEGAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT 9, 9–11 (Meena Shivdas & Sarah Coleman eds., 2010).
27
See Jaising, supra note 26; Erturk, supra note 26.
28
G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Dec.
18, 1979).
29
U.N. CEDAW, 16th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2010/2 (Mar. 1, 2010).
30
Archana Parashar, Gender Inequality and Religious Personal Laws in India, 14 BROWN J. WORLD AFF.
103, 103–12 (2008).
31
Id. at 107–38.
32
Id. at 108.
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Then, this Article argues that India’s Declaration to CEDAW’s Article 5(a)
is a substantive derogation of a peremptory norm of public international law: the
due diligence obligation—in as much as it protects the religious and cultural
attitudes that cause violence. Scientifically, this can be restated as follows: India
is implicitly claiming in its Declaration that when it comes to a conflict between
the right against gender-based discrimination and the right to freedom of
religion, it unequivocally privileges the latter, because of its median voter.
Hence, India’s declaration privileging the right to freedom of religion makes this
an empirical manifestation of the compliance deadlock over the due diligence
obligation.
What could be the explanations that account for India’s CEDAW
Declaration? The standard rejoinder of the human rights compliance literature is
that this Declaration is to be expected because, after all, norms are
epiphenomenal: nations only comply with norms that are in their material
interests.33 This argument has dominated the human rights compliance argument
and hence applies by default to the study of the nature of compliance with the
CEDAW’s due diligence.34 As an explanation for India’s Declaration to
CEDAW’s Article 5(a), this argument would entail the finding that in this
instance, the due diligence obligation does not appeal to the material interests of
nations. Scholars of human rights compliance and those who profess the
epiphenomenal faith would proclaim that India’s Declaration to CEDAW’s
Article 5(a) is solely motivated by the consideration that the due diligence norm
is epiphenomenal.35 In other words, India does not find the norm against GBV
promulgated at the international level to be relevant to its material interests.
But an examination of two significant historical moments immediately prior
to CEDAW accession in 1987 and 1985, when India was confronted with an
empirical conflict between the right against GBV and the right to freedom of
religion, reveals that the Indian government privileged the right to freedom of
religion only because of its accurate perception of its median voter as male,
religious, conservative, and firmly in favor of religious prescription even when
it conflicts with the right against GBV.36 The raison d’être for the compliant
behavior of the Indian government, reflected in its subsequent Declaration, was

33
E.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law,
International Relations, and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes
et al. eds., 2002).
34
BYERS, supra note 33; Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 33.
35
BYERS, supra note 33; Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 33; U.N. CEDAW, supra note 29, at 11.
36
These historical moments will be discussed in further detail later in this Article.
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an intense concern with appeasing its median voter—not the standard
assumption that the due diligence principle is epiphenomenal.37 The CEDAW’s
due diligence generates non-compliance in India not because norms are
epiphenomenal, but because the government is just responding as a rational actor
to perceptions of this issue by its median voter.
In order to demonstrate this, this Article proposes and tests the hypothesis
that the median voter in India is religious, male, conservative, patriarchal, and
firmly in favor of religious tradition even when it conflicts with the right against
GBV. If true, this implies that India’s CEDAW Declaration is a reflection of its
median preference. There is nothing epiphenomenal about the nature of India’s
Declaration. When the India government was confronted with the conflict
between the right to freedom of religion and the right against GBV on two
occasions immediately prior to CEDAW accession, the median voter dictated
the government’s preference. Hence, this implies that in 1993 when the Indian
government was faced with a similar conflict through the CEDAW’s due
diligence, it sought to appease its median voter preferences reflected in its
Declaration. An affirmative finding to this hypothesis implies that norms can be
restructured to make it in the nations’ rational interests to comply, providing the
keys to unlock the compliance dilemma and secure redress of the endemic
violence against women, the implications of which will be discussed in the
conclusion.
This Article is organized as follows: Section I deals with the rational choice
theory of public international law and its primary contention that norms are
indeed epiphenomenal to international life; Section II examines the primary
principles on the median voter theorem of Anthony Downs; Section III contains
the hypothesis and the research methodology of the current article; Section IV
is the empirical section of the article and examines evidence on Roop Kanwar’s
sati in 1987 and the Shah Bano Judgment in 1985 to argue that these two
instances are structured on the conflict of rights of the CEDAW’s due diligence.
The position of the median voter is sought to be traced in these two moments
through governmental action and the intersubjective societal preference by using
the principles of Downs. This analysis reveals the nature of the median voter and
the reasons for the Indian government’s preference of the right to freedom of
religion over the right against GBV. This Article concludes with the implications
of these findings on the epiphenomenal contention against public international
law.

37

U.N. CEDAW, supra note 29, at 12.
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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF RATIONAL CHOICE

What does rational choice analysis entail when applied to perceptions of
nations towards public international law? Its primary implication hitherto has
been that states’ compliance commitments are structured by perceptions of
international law as epiphenomenal. Since IR’s inception as a discipline, IR
scholars have viewed the instruments of international law with skepticism38
which owes its intellectual heritage to Thucydides who is credited with stating
that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”39 IR
scholars traditionally have had little time for international law, regarding law as
an “epiphenomenon, with rules of international law being dependent on power,
subject to short-term alteration by power-applying States, and therefore of little
relevance to how [s]tates actually behave.”40 International law has historically
just been perceived as “deceitful” language deployed to justify power interests.41
It is based on the consent of states, which implies domestic matters should
presumably not be of any transnational concern.42 The lack of an international
Hobbesist sovereign renders enforceability problematic, demonstrating the
inefficacy of international law to international life.43 While Slaughter and
Raustiala argue that this debate has acquired nuance, scholarly discourse
continues to grapple with the thesis that norms are epiphenomenal.44 In 2002,
scholars of public international law extensively theorized on rational choice, but
failed to consider the rational choice theory of voting and elections, from which
they, nevertheless, abstracted.45
This premise on the epiphenomenal nature of norms has morphed into
human rights compliance46 and continues to remain its fundamental animating
38
Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism between International Law and
International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 193, 193 (1980).
39
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937–38
(2002), http://www.jstor.org/stable/797642 (last visited Oct 13, 2016).
40
BYERS, supra note 33, at 8.
41
Jack Landman Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A
Rational Choice Perspective 3 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Chicago Working Paper Series, John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 108, 2000).
42
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State Sovereignty Sibley Lecture/Keynote Address, 25 GA. J. INT’L.
& COMP. L. 31, 32–33 (1995).
43
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 236 (1979).
44
Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 33, at 538, 549.
45
In 2002, an entire issue of The Journal of Legal Studies dealt with this question. But the major argument
only considered the abstraction of rational choice theory to international life. Robert O. Keohane, Rational
Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S307–S319 (2002).
46
Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 2600
(1998). See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
POLITICS 4 (2009).
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thesis.47 In the absence of competing explanations for the compliance deadlock
over the CEDAW’s due diligence, this explanation irrefutably asserts itself by
default. A large part of this contemporary debate has taken place around
studying CEDAW compliance, also casting doubt on the post-positivist feminist
IR contention that the mainstream discipline of IR does not take gender
seriously.
In Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Hathaway argues
emphatically that qualitative approaches make it impossible to trace
relationships between treaty ratification and state practice because the causes of
compliance cannot be separated from other domestic factors that could elide
actual causal pathways.48 This Article argues that a qualitative analysis of
CEDAW compliance in India permits a generalizable, testable proposition that
has far greater applicability across the South Asian Association of Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) region, Africa, and constitutional democracies among
the developing nations precisely because of its nuance. Hathaway clumps
different principles of human rights on “genocide, torture, fair public trials, civil
liberties and the political representation of women” in an attempt to find
empirical patterns,49 yet fails. Applying large-N analysis (i.e., studying the
empirical experiences of many countries for generalizable principles on
compliance) without contextual detail only reiterates the extant assumption on
international life that norms are indeed epiphenomenal. This is as large-N studies
lack the depth and intensity that a single experience of GBV can accurately
provide. The present Article contends that only a single contextual case study
provides nuance through the intensity of GBV that demonstrates the proper
principles on human rights compliance.
The next study terms human rights as The Paradox of Empty Promises, and
argues that the “rising gap between states’ propensity to join the international
47
While the question of the relevance of public international law to the discipline of IR began at the
inception of IR after World War II, its application to human rights compliance is a relatively new phenomenon
that has acquired scholarly prominence in the last decade of the twentieth century. The term “human rights”
refers to the corpus of human rights treaties promulgated in the wake of World War II and comprise importantly
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 1966; the Convention Against Torture, 1984; the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965; the CEDAW; and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 2000. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T. S. 195; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
48
Hathaway, supra note 39, at 1939.
49
Id. at 1939.
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human rights regime and to bring their human rights practice into compliance
with that regime challenges the efficacy of international law and questions the
authenticity of states’ legal commitment to protect the lives of their citizens.”50
This study dismisses human rights treaty ratification as mere “windowdressing,”51 but acknowledges that international global activism exerts an
independent compliance pull.52
This was supplemented by Justice Lost: The Failure of Human Rights To
Matter Where Needed Most, which demonstrates that repressor-states are as
likely as democracies to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966) and the United Nations Convention on the Right Against Torture
(1987), in its argument that human rights treaties hardly matter to actual human
rights practices.53
This paradigmatic position is countered by constructivist scholars who
demonstrate the conditions under which norms matter. Harold Justice L
concedes that “[i]nternational human rights law is not enforced . . . because
human rights norms are vague and aspirational . . . enforcement mechanisms are
toothless . . . and because national governments lack the economic self-interest
or the political will to restrain . . .” themselves.54 But nevertheless it develops a
concept—“transnational legal process”—that has generated some major studies
on compliance.55 But the question of why norms matter remains to be resolved.
Further, Beth Simmons argues that the human rights regime has been brought
into effect by governments themselves, while noting that causal evidence
remains elusive.56 Despite absence of a quintessential Hobbesist sovereign,
CEDAW norms are enforced against governments through local activism,
implying an independent normative pull that influences movements fighting
gender oppression.57
One of the defining studies is Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks
in International Politics, which argues that international norms are diffused into
national life through principled transnational advocates.58 The violence against
50
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of
Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373, 1374 (2005).
51
Id. at 1378.
52
Id.
53
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights
Law to Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. PEACE RES. 407, 410 (2007).
54
Koh, supra note 46, at 1399.
55
Id. at 1408.
56
SIMMONS, supra note 46, at 1.
57
Id. at 371–72.
58
MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN
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women’s movement disseminated its norm in terms of existing human rights
discourse which was its greatest innovation.59
This theoretical position has been critiqued as a trickle-down approach as
CEDAW norms developed at the global level are constantly subject to
“appropriation and interpretation” in local contexts, which is its only mechanism
of enforceability.60 This argument was enhanced by a full-scale study of
CEDAW compliance that discovered “[a] range of explanatory factors . . . in
particular socio-economic prosperity [of a state]; the political system [of a state]
and the degree to which women’s interests can be represented [in the
constitution] and the cultural affinity between domestic gender norms and the
CEDAW principles.”61 Hence, a major factor impeding compliance is that
international gender norms do not reflect local context.62 But is the conflict of
rights frame of the due diligence really disparate from national life? The
empirical evidence presented herein is premised on India’s historical reaction to
confrontation of the due diligence’s conflict of rights frame even prior to its
CEDAW accession, contesting the argument that norms are top-down and
preclude enforceability because of a disjuncture with national life.
A. Contesting the Epiphenomenal Thesis
All the existing studies on the CEDAW study compliance after its fact,
which does not dislodge the epistemological lens that norms are epiphenomenal.
The intense nature of GBV has resulted in a compliance deadlock for more than
two decades after the adoption of the due diligence, yet the epistemological lens
of the compliance literature precludes a solution. The current article departs from
the earlier studies which have studied compliance after treaty ratification by
locating the causes precluding compliance at the two historical moments when
India was confronted with a conflict between right against GBV and the right to
freedom of religion in 1987 and 1985 prior to CEDAW accession in 1993.63 This
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2014), https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JSF8AgAAQBAJ&oi=
fnd&pg=PR9&dq=Advocacy+beyond+borders&ots=v93U_lmLhb&sig=Pz9mkubMbu4OQlXRd8vQHz3E8Y
Q (last visited Dec 7, 2016).
59
Id. at 172.
60
Susanne Zwingel, From Intergovernmental Negotiations to (Sub)National Change: A Transnational
Perspective on the Impact of CEDAW, 7 INT’L. FEMINIST J. POL. 400, 414 (2005).
61
Zwingel, supra note 14, at 13 (emphasis added).
62
Cf. Zwingel, supra note 14 (explaining that global norms only unfold their value in ongoing and
collective interpretations and re-interpretations within local practices).
63
See Rehan Abeyratne & Dipika Jain, Domestic Violence Legislation in India: The Pitfalls of a Human
Rights Approach to Gender Equality, 21 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 333, 340 (2012) (describing the
legislation that India enacted in 1986 creating the new offense of “dowry death,” prohibiting a longstanding
religious practice that involved violence against women).
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permits an alteration of the epistemological lens on compliance as it
demonstrates that the rational choice theory of voting and elections in a
democracy perfectly explains the causes behind India’s Declaration to
CEDAW’s Article 5. The following section presents the basic propositions on
the median voter in a democracy prior to examining the evidence on the Indian
government at two significant historical moments.
II. THE MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM
One of the basic hypotheses of political science is that majoritarian decisionmaking reflects median preferences characterized as a “fundamental principle of
democracy.”64 The application of economics to public policy-making has helped
uncover basic empirical patterns of political structure.65 McEachern offers a
succinct summary of the median voter hypothesis: “[I]f political opinion on a
particular issue may be viewed as lying in a single dimension, then competition
among political candidates will force them towards the position held by the
median voter.”66
The median voter theorem has its basis in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, and
states that if there exists two different alternatives in a majoritarian democracy
and the identity of the preferred alternative is unknown, majoritarian voting
helps determine the preferred alternative.67 When the population as a whole is
required to choose and each individual possesses a vote distinct and separate
from the others and as the number of people eligible to vote increases, the votes
will coalesce towards the preferred alternative.68 Hence, this implies that voter
preference on the issue of a conflict between the right against GBV and the right
to freedom of religion can be determined with accuracy as majoritarian
preference is expected to coalesce around the preferred alternative.
In 1929, Harold Hotelling propounded his famous principle of minimum
differentiation in Stability in Competition and argued that in a two-party
democracy party ideologies resemble one another and “each party strives to
64

Roger D. Congleton, The Median Voter Model, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 707, 712

(2004).
65

Randall G. Holcombe, The Median Voter Model in Public Choice Theory, 61 PUB. CHOICE 115, 115

(1989).
66
William A. McEachern, Collective Decision Rules and Local Debt Choice: A Test of the Median-voter
Hypothesis, NAT’L. TAX J. 129, 129 (1978).
67
David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet
Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 34, 34 (1996).
68
Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Individual Errors, and Collective Performance: Empirical Evidence
on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 5 GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 211 (1996).
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make its platform as much like the other’s as possible.”69 This principle draws
from economic competition and the tendency of firms to sell identical goods to
imitate each other as much as possible.70 Rather than differentiate themselves,
firms tend to locate themselves on a middle position so as to not lose customers
to other firms selling similar goods. While this theory has been expanded by the
inclusion of price competition,71 spillover,72 and labor,73 Hotelling’s principle
still constitutes part of the sacrosanct corpus on which the median voter theorem
has been propounded within the discipline of political science.74 Hence, political
parties should exhibit a relatively stable position that reveals the median vote on
a conflict between the right against GBV and the right to freedom of religion,
despite proffering ostensibly different ideologies.
Duncan Black argued that in majoritarian voting systems, the median
position exerts a pull on all the voters, such that voters with different preferences
on a single issue will usually converge on the median position.75 This theory
applies only when voters exhibit a “single peaked” or a single preference out of
multiple options.76 Therefore, when an issue has just two preferences,
majoritarian voting converges on and helps determine the median preference. 77
All of the above theorems led to Anthony Downs’s An Economic Theory of
Democracy to explain that political parties and incumbent governments in a
democracy adopt a preference on an issue, which usually reflects the median
voter’s position.78 This study remains a basic tenet of the discipline of political
science, has been uncontested for more than half a century and has “spawned a
vast literature and has had ramifications throughout the social sciences and in
allied disciplines such as law and philosophy.”79

69
Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, in THE COLLECTED ECONOMICS ARTICLES OF HAROLD
HOTELLING 50, 54 (1990).
70
Id. at 41.
71
Gabriel A. Picone, David B. Ridley & Paul A. Zandbergen, Distance decreases with differentiation:
Strategic agglomeration by retailers, 27 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 463, 463 (2009).
72
J. Myles Shaver & Fredrick Flyer, Agglomeration Economies, Firm Heterogeneity, and Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States, 21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1175 (2000).
73
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY VOLUME 271 (8th ed. 1920).
74
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 117 (1957); Bernard Grofman,
Introduction to BERNARD GROFMAN, INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 1 (1995).
75
Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 26–30 (1948).
76
Id. at 28.
77
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POLIT. ECON. 135,
150 (1957).
78
DOWNS, supra note 74, at 140.
79
Grofman, supra note 74 at 1.
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Downs defines political parties as a group of men seeking to control the
“governing apparatus” by gaining office in a “duly constituted election.”80
Politicians are motivated “solely in order to attain income, prestige[,] and
power” of electoral office, the policies of political parties are created with an eye
to maximize votes.81 Party ideologies develop solely to offset political
uncertainties and operate as instruments to maximize votes.82 Downs notes that
political parties are not agents of any social groups but merely act to maximize
votes.83 Party ideology is a reflection of the position “an overwhelming portion
of the electorate agree upon and strongly desire” and “no party can gain by
opposing passionate majority.”84 Voters are rational and exhibit concern over
political issues. But they do not display great interest in any overarching
philosophical Weltanschauungen and hence parties can take ad hoc or temporary
stands on issues as they arise.85 In fact, “parties are rarely able to adjust their
ideologies at exactly the speed which conditions warrant.”86 It is to be expected
that when confronted with a conflict between GBV and freedom of religion,
politicians will merely act to maximize votes and their adoption of one side of
the issue is not indicative of any overarching Weltanschauung.87 This
conceptualization of political parties permits alteration of the conceptual lens of
the epiphenomenal thesis because it implies parties will take ad hoc positions on
the due diligence frame and not one universal position.
For Downs, all issues in a democracy can be broken down into a Left-Right
scale, which is linear and ranks voter preferences from a zero to a hundred.88
Each voter’s preference is single peaked.89 Downs draws from Hotelling’s
principle to state that parties tend to move closer to each other to not lose out on
votes, and will “converge” on the middle position.90 Parties will not necessarily
move to a position of moderation but to a position that reflects majoritarian
preference and can secure the maximum number of votes.91 Hence, if the median
position on an issue converges on the extreme left or the extreme right with
80

DOWNS, supra note 74, at 24
Id. at 28.
82
Id. at 111.
83
Id. at 97.
84
Id. at 98.
85
Id. at 98; Weltanschauung is defined as a particular philosophy or view of life; the world view of an
individual or group, Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/weltanschauung (last
visited Sep. 8, 2018).
86
Id. at 111.
87
Id. at 98.
88
Id. at 117.
89
Id. at 118.
90
Id. at 117.
91
Id. at 118.
81
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voters predominantly clustered at that end, parties will unhesitatingly move
towards that position on an issue.92
Further, Downs argues that the basic objective pursued by a democratic
government is the act of maximizing votes.93 Decision-making by an incumbent
government is premised on the majority principle94 as incumbent governments
gain or lose votes on the basis of marginal changes in policy. When crafting
policy, incumbent governments usually do not make drastic alterations from
previously existing policies, but just slight changes.95 Voters reject policies not
on the basis of universalizing philosophies, but merely in terms of how much
they disfavor the incumbent policy change from its predecessor.96 On an issue
where there exists only two different alternatives, the government is keenly
aware of the choice that is going to be reflected in majoritarian preference in the
next election.97 The government chooses the alternative that the electorate most
prefers.98 Otherwise, the opposition parties would capitalize on this position and
take away votes.99 Theoretically a coalition of opposition can hit on a minority
preference that can defeat the incumbent.100 In this exception, the government
adopts the minority preference on the issue, implying that incumbents adopt any
policy that maximizes votes.101 If the opposition party attains power, it is forced
to adopt majoritarian preferences or face the prospect of being out of office the
next term due to unhappy voters. Therefore, a passionate majority always
determines incumbent policies.102
The next Section demonstrates that India’s CEDAW Declaration was merely
a reflection of the government responding as a rational actor to an empirical
conflict of the due diligence, implying this position is not fixed but is always
subject to marginal change. Hence, theoretically, the government can be made
to favor policies prohibiting GBV when its electorate perceives a marginal utility
in this direction contesting the argument that epiphenomenal norms are not
bound to induce compliance in the foreseeable future. Finally, even though
Downs’s principle is applicable in the context of a two-party democracy, the

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 64.
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historical moments of the current article encompasses one electoral tenure of the
Indian National Congress (INC) making this an irrelevant consideration.
All these principles demonstrate that it is possible to mathematically discern
the nature of the median voter on the conflict between the right against GBV and
the right to freedom of religion by examining the behavior of political parties
and the incumbent government when they are confronted with an empirical
conflict of the due diligence.
The validity of the Downs’ principles animate the discipline of political
science. This model rendered the previous sociological and psychological
positions flawed and provided an answer to political science in the language of
economics, which subsequently revolutionized the study of democracy and
elections.103 Congleton argues that Down’s simple model of economic decisionmaking permits easy transmission of knowledge better than complex models.104
Particularly, the simple model of the median voter is an “engine of analysis” that
enables development of hypothesis on complex phenomena, whose simplicity
provides all that is needed to grasp reality.105
Down’s ideas have broadly inspired research traditions on the role
information plays in party competition, voter participation choice and models of
candidate competition.106 The concept of uncertainty, which conceptualizes the
voter as an investor, has inspired research on voter shortcuts like media analysis,
party messages, and campaigns.107 The concept of thresholds has inspired an
argument on electoral and policy inertia.108 Down’s argument that voting is a
rationally instrumental act is contested on the basis of empirical observation109
and group voting.110 Also, researchers have tried to develop models on voter

103

Grofman, supra note 74, at 2.
Congleton, supra note 64, at 1.
105
Id.
106
Grofman, supra note 74, at 4.
107
SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER 7, 9–10 (1991).
108
Roger Noll, Downsian Thresholds and the Theory of Political Advertising, in INFORMATION,
PARTICIPATION AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 37, 43 (Bernard Grofman
ed., 1995).
109
Carole Jean Uhlaner, What the Downsian Voter Weighs: A Reassessment of the Costs and Benefits of
Action, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE
67, 67 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1995).
110
Amihai Glazer, Political Equilibrium Under Group Identification, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION
AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 81, 84 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1995).
104
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prediction,111 voter behavior,112 the role of cognition in framing salient issues,113
and presidential voting.114
But there does not exist any qualitative studies tracing empirical patterns of
the median voter theorem in the context of gendered compliance in the setting
of developing nations. Following the footsteps of the major research traditions,
this Article initiates the conversation about the median vote on gender in the
context of human rights compliance by testing the median voter hypothesis
against the due diligence’s conflicts of rights frame in India.
III. HYPOTHESIS
Based on the median voter theorem, this Article hypothesizes that when
confronted with an empirical conflict of rights frame between the right against
GBV and the right to freedom of religion, the behaviors of the incumbent Indian
government and political parties should coalesce on the median voter. This
would accurately reveal the nature of the median voter to be religious, male,
conservative, patriarchal, and firmly in favor of religious attitudes even when
they conflict with the right against GBV. It follows that the compliance
commitment of the Indian government to the CEDAW is a direct continuation
of its historical reaction when confronted with a conflict between the freedom
of religion and the right against GBV. Since, the conflict of rights frame is a
two-dimensional issue, with the right to freedom of religion on the right and the
right against GBV on the left, it is to be expected that voters in India exhibit a
preference for one side. Further, in the absence of survey data measuring this
preference,115 the behaviors of the incumbent government and political parties
are expected to be accurate proxies for the median position, which contributes
to a feminist insight that will help argue for a reformulation of the international
norm on GBV.
The empirical confrontation between the liberal sphere representing the right
to freedom of gender-based equality and traditional, cultural attitudes emanating
111
John Ferejohn, The Spatial Model and Elections, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION AND CHOICE: AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 107, 108 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1995).
112
JAMES M. ENELOW & MELVIN J. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING 2 (1984).
113
Thomas H. Hammond & Brian D. Humes, “What This Campaign Is All about Is. . .”: A Rational
Choice Alternative to the Downsian Spatial Model of Elections, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION AND CHOICE:
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 141, 142 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1995).
114
Arthur H. Miller & Martin P. Wattenberg, Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance
Evaluations of Presidential Candidates,1952-1980, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 359, 360 (1985).
115
The following Section explains the lack of survey data and the rationale for the current Article’s
research design in greater detail.
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from religious precepts are potentially generalizable across South Asia to
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka on account of these regions being undergirded
by a common culture of patriarchy.116 Further, traditional, cultural attitudes
causing GBV can be witnessed in many jurisdictions in Africa.117 This indicates
that the median voter theorem hypothesis is generalizable across the developing
nations and a potential solution to the compliance dilemma over the CEDAW’s
due diligence. However, the scope of the current Article is limited to India.

A. Research Methodology
In the absence of explicit survey data measuring the nature of the median
voter in India, this Article relies on newspaper reports as primary evidence to
reconstruct the nature of the median voter vis-à-vis India’s CEDAW
Declaration. The rationale is that in 1987, the Indian feminist movement was
still in its incipient state and there does not exist any survey measuring the
median voter. Arguably the current article only discerns the nature of the median
voter in the late 1980’s. But the fact that GBV remains an endemic feature of the
Indian society and there has been no change in the position of the Indian
government on its CEDAW Declaration points to the possibility that these
attitudes remain stable till the present day. These reports provide important
tidbits of information that permit an empirical piecing together of the nature of
the median voter on the conflict between the right against GBV and the right to
freedom of religion. Undoubtedly, the present Article requires supplementation
by an empirical survey designed to capture the attitudes of the present-day
median Indian voters. In the absence of empirical survey, this Article hopes to
propound this hypothesis as the first step. Further, in the absence of survey data
measuring the preference of the median voter in 1985 and 1987, this Article
deliberately utilizes Downs’ principles explained previously, to qualitatively
trace the median voter position.118
This research is hampered by the fact that Indian newspapers do not possess
electronic news archives prior to 1990. Hence, the primary sources used are
limited to the international newspaper sources available on ProQuest between
1986–1988. Also, it is impossible to obtain the posters of the political parties in
Deorala in 1987, except through the only available feminist investigative
116

Radhika Coomaraswamy, Human Security and Gender Violence, 40 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4729, 4730

(2005).
117
C. C. Nweze, Domestication of DEDAW: Points to Consider for Customary Laws and Practices, in
WITHOUT PREJUDICE: CEDAW AND THE DETERMINATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN A LEGAL AND CULTURAL
CONTEXT 49, 71 (Meena Shivdas & Sarah Coleman eds., 2010).
118
DOWNS supra note 74, at 140.
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journalist report that is available online.119 The report was prepared by the
Bombay Union of Women Journalists in Deorala in October 1987, a few weeks
subsequent to Roop’s sati.120 Hence, the feminist case that the median voter is
Hindu, male, patriarchal, and firmly in favor of the religious attitudes that cause
GBV will be demonstrated on the basis of Downs’ principles.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE MEDIAN VOTER
IN INDIA?
In 1987 and 1985, the Indian government was confronted with an empirical
conflict of the CEDAW’s due diligence between the right to freedom of religion
and the right against GBV through Roop’s sati and the Shah Bano judgment of
the Supreme Court of India.121 This Article examines the empirical conflict of
rights situation in 1987 and then 1985, in order to trace the moments in time that
were as close as possible to India’s CEDAW Declaration in 1993.
A. The Intersubjective Patriarchal, Religious Atmosphere That Primed the
Sati of Roop
A reconstruction of the moments of Roop’s sati permits discernment of the
median voter in India through three empirical trails—the intersubjective
patriarchal atmosphere of the immediate society, the behavior of political parties
and the incumbent government. This Article argues that these empirical trails
confirm that the Indian voter is male, religious, patriarchal, and firmly in favor
of religious attitudes that propagate GBV. First, the intersubjective social
environment that permitted Roop’s satis to take place publicly in the presence
of thousands of witnesses shows the pervasive grip of the sanctity of the Hindu
religious practices that sanction the burning of a widow on the funeral pyre of
her husband as an act of ultimate wifely chastity. Second, politicians created
political capital in an attempt to capture a vote-bank. They organized and led
religious processions that advocated sati, clearly kowtowing to their median
119
Madhu Kishwar & Ruth Vanita, The Burning of Roop Kanwar, 42 MANUSHI 15, 15 (1987), http://www.
manushi-india.org/pdfs_issues/PDF%20files%204243/15.%20The%20Burning%20of%20Roop%20Kanwar.pdf.
120
This Article deliberately uses the first name of Roop Kanwar to capture the unique cultural tendencies
of Indian society where people usually go by first names. Family names are a relatively recent colonial invention
and were meant to secure Western standardization. It seems appropriate to the memory of Roop to refer to her
first name and separate it from the patriarchal connotations of the family which is the primary instrumentality of
patriarchy, which also captures the intense personal nature of her suffering in her final moments on the funeral
pyre of her husband Maal Singh.
121
Radhika Coomaraswamy, Human Security and Gender Violence, 40 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4729, 4730,
4733 (2005); Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors., (1985) 3 SCR 844, 846 (India).
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voter. They could not have done so a priori. This action demonstrates that there
existed a deep-seated religious patriarchal tradition that rose to the surface at the
time of Roop’s satis and which was manipulated by the politicians. Third, the
widespread social support for Roop’s satis prevented the incumbent government
from openly opposing this religious constituency. The incumbent government
genuinely feared losing votes if it openly condemned the event, thereby
demonstrating the domestic rational choice considerations that precluded it from
privileging the norm against GBV. An exploration of the above trails follows.
It is impossible to grasp the intensity of the murder of Roop without
comprehending its intersubjective context. Sati is embedded in the ancient
Hindu patriarchal traditions that permeate with textual injunctions outlining a
system of strict sexual control and monogamous chastity,122 mediated with
misogynistic conceptualizations that link the subordination of women to divine
self-realization—the ultimate purpose of Hindu metaphysical doctrine.123
Roop was an eighteen-year-old girl who had been married for just eight
months to Maal Singh.124 Allegedly, in September 4, 1987, she was forcibly
consigned to his funeral pyre.125 The death of her husband is attributed to an
intentional overdose of anti-depressants, covered up as a case of
gastroenteritis.126 Roop was dutifully present at his deathbed.127 Thereafter,
details are obfuscated.
In November 1987, a court was told on pain of perjury that she was “forced”
into the funeral pyre128 by her brothers-in-law armed with swords, covered to
her shoulder with firewood.129 A witness recalls what happened at the cremation
ground, “I saw Roop dressed in bridal make-up. . . . There were about 900 people
122
Translation of the primary Hindu text that articulates these principles, the Manusmriti and particularly,
its Chapter IX is available in The Laws of Manu, in 25 SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST (George Bühler trans.,
1886), http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/manu/manu09.htm.
123
Stein, supra note 21, at 255.
124
Kin Killed Widow, India Court Told, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1987, at 12.
125
Uproar Over Rajput “Sati”: Wife Emolates Herself on Husband’s Funeral Pyre, HINDUISM TODAY
(Dec. 1987), https://www.hinduismtoday.com/modules/smartsection/item.php?itemid=472 [hereinafter Uproar
Over Rajput “Sati”].
126
PADMA PRAKASH ET AL., TRIAL BY FIRE: A REPORT ON ROOP KANWAR’S DEATH 3, 8–9 (1987). But see
JOHN S. HAWLEY, Sati, THE BLESSING AND THE CURSE 7 (1994) (“On September 3, Mal Singh died suddenly
from a malady that has been variously diagnosed as acute gastroenteritis, a burst appendix, and suicide by
poisoning.”)
127
PRAKASH ET AL., supra note 126, at 3.
128
According to Hindu ritual practice a dead corpse is disposed in a funeral pyre constructed of
combustible material like firewood, sandalwood and the flame has to be repeatedly stoked. Aarti Dhar, Making
Funeral Pyres Eco-friendly, HINDU, May 15, 2005, at 1.
129
Kin Killed Widow, India Court Told, supra note 124.
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[present]. . . . [i]t took an hour for the preparation of the pyre.”130 This indicates
that Roop’s family made a public and social decision to consign her to the pyre
and the word spread, attracting this huge crowd. Roop was reported as swaying
on her walk to the funeral pyre, strongly indicating administration of opium,
which is common for sati.131
The Los Angeles Times reported that “[a]t one point, the fire went out and
Kanwar tried to free herself . . . but she was forced back. . . . [and] her cries were
allegedly drowned out by shouts from about 400 villagers who had gathered to
watch.”132 Witnesses cautiously reported that Roop was heard screaming
“Mummy, Papa” in English when the fire of the funeral pyre briefly died down
and had to be relit, which was courteously undertaken by her brothers-in-law
surrounding the pyre who made her escape virtually impossible.133
The close relationship of the former British Empire with India has resulted
in a naturalization and “native” acclimatization of the English language in
everyday intimate realities like within the family.134 English terms permeate
seamlessly in everyday Indian culture and are a common form of address.135 The
fact that Roop used English terms in what was probably a half-burnt and
unconscious state indicates this could be a normal form of address for her
parents. This also indicates that Roop was well-educated, and that her family
was an average middle-class family.136 Yet her family was deeply conditioned
by the intersubjective patriarchal, Hindu religious atmosphere. Roop was
married off at the age of eighteen, in accordance with ancient Hindu religious
prescription that cautions prepubescent marriages as a way of restraining female
sexuality.137 In the immediate aftermath of Roop’s death, her family members
affirmed that her death was an “honor.”138 Evidence does not exist to determine
if this was a voluntary or a coerced statement. Her family was not informed of
130

Uproar Over Rajput “Sati”, supra note 125.
Id.; PRAKASH ET AL., supra note 126, at 7.
132
Kin Killed Widow, India Court Told, supra note 128.
133
PRAKASH ET AL., supra note 130, at 6–7.
134
Vasudha Bharadwaj, Language of Nationhood: Political Ideologies and the Place of English in 20th
Century India, at vi-vii (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester); see also Vineeta
Chand, [v]at is Going On? Local and Global Ideologies about Indian English, 38 LANGUAGE SOC’Y 393, 405
(2009).
135
Zacharias Thundyil, Paper presented at the Michigan Linguistic Society Meeting: Facts about Current
Indian English (Oct. 3, 1970), at 25.
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HAWLEY, supra note 126, at 116; see also Kishwar & Vanita, supra note 119, at 16.
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Roop’s apparently “voluntary” decision and were not present at the site of her
burning.139 The very fact that a well-educated 18-year-old wife was allowed to
burn in accordance with an ancient Hindu custom demonstrates the pervasive
grip that these pernicious traditions possess in the Indian psyche. Hence, it is to
be noted that following the ancient Hindu religious prescriptions mandating
GBV is an inherent facet of the Indian middle class strongly indicating its
median connotations.
This is supplemented by the fact that Roop’s in-laws were perceived to be
of middle class status.140 The report by the independent feminist inquiry
attributed this status to Roop’s father-in-law being a school teacher and her
husband being trained in the sciences.141 Particularly, this report comments on
the “prosperity” of Deorala, which is comprised of upper-castes including the
Rajput caste142 to which Roop belonged.143 The village exhibited normal
consumer goods and signified a marked absence of any debilitating signs of
poverty common to the subcontinent.144 Hence, Roop’s use of English in her
final moments viewed in conjunction with the middle class status of her natal
and patrilineal family indicates that Hindu patriarchy still grips the Indian
intelligentsia and accurately throws light on the median position. If the educated
middle class is in the pervasive grip of Hindu patriarchy, then this is an accurate
indicator on the rest of society.
Further, Roop’s murder was a public spectacle conducted in the presence of
thousands of spectators none of whom dared interfere or assist the besieged
Roop.145 Instead, some villagers kept reiterating the fear of being cursed.146
Could Roop’s sati have occurred sans social support? The pervasive occurrence
of dowry deaths with the “tacit approval” of society147 demonstrates the general
social endorsement of murdering a wife, affording an empirical glimpse on the
Indian electorate in 1987.148
On September 10, 1987, a chunari mahatsav, an event where Roop’s bridal
veil was burned to symbolically commemorate her death, took place in the
139
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Kishwar & Vanita, supra note 119, at 16; see also HAWLEY, supra note 126, at 116.
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Kishwar & Vanita, supra note 119, at 16.
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presence of 100,000 spectators despite a governmental ban;149 another report
estimates it at 300,000.150 “Many politicians offered prayers . . . . They included
the State Janata Party chief, Kalyan Singh; Rajendra Singh Rathore, state chief
of Yuva Janata, the party’s youth wing[;] and Deependra Singh Shekhawat, a
former member of the state Assembly.”151 Plans for building a temple had
collected $120,000.152 The temple was constructed in November, pulled down,
but reconstructed.153 The state government of Rajasthan flooded Deorala with
its officers at the mahotsav, (which was the religious ceremony celebrating the
sati of Roop), enabling the villagers to pray in peace.154 Hence, the government’s
lukewarm response to Roop’s sati, failure to exercise due diligence and
prosecute the accused, and open support of the religious lobby incontrovertibly
indicates the government’s perception of the religious, conservative, male,
Indian median voter. On the basis of Downs’s principle, it is possible to conclude
that if the Indian Government’s behavior was in favor of the religious lobby,
then incontrovertibly this indicates the median voter to be located at this point.
On September 22nd, a feminist journalist team visited Deorala and observed
a group of boys chanting slogans modeled on political slogans at the site where
Roop’s sati took place.155 Some examples were: “Sati ho to kaisi ho? Roop
Kanwar ke jaisi ho. Jab tak suraj chand rahega Roop Kanwar tera naam
rahega.”156 The examples transliterate to mean that Roop’s name will live on
like the sun and moon. This chant was modeled on a slogan praising the prime
minister Rajiv Gandhi and Indira Gandhi, “Desh ha neta kaisa ho Rajiv Gandhi
(X, Y, Z) jaisa ho.”157 Another slogan was based on an anti-cow slaughter slogan
of a right-wing, Hindu political party: “Desh dharam ka nata hai. Sati hamari
mata hai.”158 This transliterates as veneration of sati as the primordial mother of
the Indian nation.
The report identifies how the regional wings of the major national party, the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), pandered to the Rajput lobby by accusing the
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women of being disrespectful toward Hindu culture, frequenting bars, and living
in general debauchery.159 It is important to note that this empirical information
reveals that there exists a pervasive, patriarchal element in society, and the state
leader is merely drawing upon this frame as opposed to anything else. The fact
that the state political party feels compelled to conduct rallies condemning the
activism of women demonstrates that there exists a conflict between traditional
religious attitudes and the right against GBV. It indicates, however, that the
Government is pandering to the constituency of traditional religious attitudes.
In December 1987, a religious leader and former member of Parliament,
Swami Agnivesh, was arrested for demonstrating against the sati in Deorala.160
Agnivesh was also challenged to a verbal duel by another religious leader,
Jagatguru,161 which indirectly implicates societal opinion. A member of
Parliament who saw fit to agitate against sati reveals his perception of the
median voter.
On September 22, 1988, Roop’s father, Maan Singh, and father-in-law,
Sumer Singh, organized a gathering of 3,000 people; and the Rani Sathi Staal, a
sati temple in Deorala, collected $12,000 in donations for a public religious
event commemorating Roop’s death anniversary.162 Despite a Supreme Court
ban-order, “50,000 members of society including politicians attended” again.163
The fact that the sati incident provoked “immediate outrage across India”164 and
engaged the intelligentsia, members of feminist organizations, religious leaders,
and political leaders demonstrates its salience to the Indian electorate.165
Could political parties have organized rallies or mobilized support without a
pre-existing, tacit social base favoring religion over gender equality? Downs’s
theory supports the finding that political parties and governments perceive that
the majority preference favors religious tradition and provides a rational
opportunity to exploit votes. The median voter’s preference for the ancient
Hindu rationalization of sati could not have been possible unless these
patriarchal, religious tendencies were deeply entrenched in the Indian psyche.
Down’s theory lends support to the argument that the incumbent government
159
160
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and politicians supported the pro-sati lobby only because they accurately
perceived their median voter to be located there. The prevalent attendance of
prominent members of society coupled with pervasive public acclamation
represented by this massive gathering once again incontrovertibly indicates the
median position to be firmly in favor of the Hindu religious practices that
motivate GBV.
Yet another factor that demonstrates the median position of the Indian voter
is the widespread social activity to glorify sati or create a cult around the
practice.166 The independent feminist report on Roop’s sati has identified that
the glorification could be purely attributed to rational politicians exploiting an
election opportunity.167 This report has empirically identified that politicians
have attempted to capitalize on this votebank.168 Apart from confirming the
interpretation of the Indian Government’s reaction to be in accordance with the
median voter theorem, it appears the feminist report attempts to raise social
consciousness by arguing that religious attitudes are not entrenched but are
merely cynically exploited by politicians.169 The feminist report notes that it is
not rustic ignorance, but conscious exercise of deliberation that kept alive the
religious traditions that emerged to glorify sati in the aftermath of Roop’s
burning.170 This Article argues, however, that this report’s hypothesis requires
reformulation in accordance with Downs’s theory. The evidence reasonably
supports the idea that politicians only exploit those sentiments that are exhibited
by the median voter. This then is evidence that this section of the Indian
electorate exhibits deep reverence for those cultural traditions that openly
promote GBV? Undoubtedly the politicians did their best to capitalize on the
fervor, but was it their sole creation? Can politicians create something new in
the wake of this historical moment? It seems like these religious sentiments were
deep-rooted and negate the feminist scholars’ contention that rational politicians
created and then exploited these sentiments. If politicians are assumed to behave
exactly in the manner posited by Downs, then it follows by implication that they
are conforming to his model and catering to the median voter’s preference. By
implication, the politicians’ behavior demonstrates the attitude of the median
Indian voter, even though the feminist report is an explicit counterargument to
this idea.171 But presenting a scientific, empirical truth will enable a stronger
feminist position as it will permit mathematical measurement of the median
166
167
168
169
170
171
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Indian electorate and bolster the feminist contention that the majority of the
Indian population exhibits religious attitudes that motivate GBV.
Further, on November 10, the state government passed an ordinance to
punish abetment to sati “through cross voting with only 81 of the 115 members
of the Congress party and 35 of 85 opposition members being present.”172 This
ordinance became central legislation in 1988.173 A documentary prepared in
1988, on the anniversary of Roop’s death, characterized the Indian
Government’s reaction as “deafening silence,”174 indirectly implicating its
lukewarm legislation and efforts to prosecute the parties accused in Roop’s
murder.175
It should be noted that the Indian Government did pass legislation which
provided a feeble punishment of just upto one year’s imprisonment for aiding
and abetting sati.176 But, if norms were epiphenomenal, what caused the Indian
government to pass any legislation, however lukewarm, to punish abetting sati?
It seems like the government was independently influenced by the normative
ideal of gender-based equality. Only this theory seems to explain the puzzle of
legislation on sati given the government’s contradictory behavior based on its
perception of the median, thus countering the argument that the norm of genderbased equality is epiphenomenal. In fact, the government passing legislation on
this matter lends credence to the interpretation of the Indian government’s
behavior on the basis of Downs. If feminist activism can induce any change,
however marginal, in the perception of the common voter, it would be possible
to influence the reaction of the Indian government. Formulating the compliance
behavior of governments on the basis of the epiphenomenal contention
precludes a solution to the compliance dilemma. Only careful consideration of
gendered compliance enables alteration of the standard contention that all noncompliance with all norms at all times are epiphenomenal. If at this time, even
at the height of Indian support for sati, the Indian government felt compelled to
pass legislation prohibiting the glorification of sati, then a change in the median
position can induce more substantial change. This possibility implies that the
democratic government of even one of the worst places to be a woman can be
172
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induced to comply with the CEDAW on the basis of its perception of the median
voter. This finding unequivocally negates the contention that norms are
epiphenomenal. Rational choice theory of voting and elections helps identify the
causes behind the apparently epiphenomenal nature of human rights norms,
simultaneously negating the contention of feminist IR—that the mainstream
discipline of political science is patriarchal and hegemonic—as one of the
fundamental principles of political science enables discernment of a solution to
the world’s largest compliance deadlock and provides a positive thrust for the
feminist movement.
B. The Shah Bano Judgment
In 1985, a Muslim divorcée, Shah Bano, secured marginal alimony from the
Supreme Court of India against her lawyer-husband who divorced her arbitrarily
in accordance with the prevailing Sharia law after forty-three years of
marriage.177 The divorce occurred in 1975 and she appealed to the Supreme
Court claiming destitution.178 The decision rendered by Chief Justice
Chandrachud granted alimony of forty U.S. dollars a month, and critiqued the
patriarchal precepts of Islam.179 This ruling provoked a controversy amongst the
Muslim religious leaders.180 Millions of Muslims demonstrated across India and
burnt effigies of the Hindu judge and termed this “blatant interference” in
religious affairs.181
Syed Abdullah Bakhari, Imam of Delhi’s largest mosque, immediately
responded: “We don’t recognize this decision. We will not accept such a direct
interference with Muslim personal law.”182 This provoked a national furor
leading to fiery demonstrations against the judgment.183 The Prime Minister,
Rajiv Gandhi, was reportedly lobbied by feminist activists and religious leaders
about possible parliamentary action on the Shah Bano Judgment.184 The
feminists did not want the Prime Minister to take any action upsetting the grant
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of maintenance to Shah Bano. Whereas the Muslim clerics wanted Parliament
to pass laws to keep these religious matters out of the purview of the secular
laws of the land. There was concern in the Prime Minister’s party about en masse
defections of Muslims who organized their own political party.185 This forced
Mr. Gandhi to introduce a bill in Parliament which was characterized by a
newspaper as “grubbing for the Moslem vote is the reverse of the coin that says
you are being sensitive to Moslem feelings.”186 This statement indicates that the
government was trying to please the median voter preference for traditional
religious attitudes on Islam. In other words, the Bill identified the location of the
median voter in India to be in favor of the traditional, religious attitudes that
cause GBV, which in itself indicates the median voter’s position. The issue was
also termed a “major constitutional and political issue,” with one female
Dandavate politician describing the atmosphere as “charged with communal
tension.”187 This indicates the widespread median preference on the Shah Bano
Judgment to be firmly in favor of the traditional atttidues that opposed the grant
of maintenance by the secular court. This judgment instigated Hindu-Muslim
riots in New Delhi and led to the downfall of the Indian National Congress in
the states of Jammu and Kashmir.188 These agitations forced the Gandhi
government to pass a law in 1985 that subjected alimony to the Sharia, which
took it out of purview of secular law and effectively annulled Shah Bano’s
victory.189
The above analysis indicates that the Indian government caved to pressure
by its minority religious constituency. The Indian government anticipated that it
would lose its votes and popularity if it angered the Muslim community. The
agitations over the Shah Bano Judgment provoked a major crisis in Indian
society which by itself indicates that it is a major issue in the Indian electorate.
Hence, implicitly the behavior of the government passing legislation overturning
the Supreme Court’s grant of maintenance to Shah Bano implies the
government’s perception of the median voter in India. In the absence of any
survey data, the behavior of the Government of India and Indian society permits
inferences on the nature of the median voter in India by using the theory of
Downs (1954). When confronted with a conflict between gender-equality and
185
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religion, the government was compelled to choose the latter because of an
intense concern with appeasing voter preference that reflects the median position
on this issue.
It should be noted that both of the above empirical instances evoked national
outrage and discussion, implying that GBV provokes heated passion and
national emotion across India. This gives sufficient ground to claim that India,
when it issued its CEDAW Declaration in 1993, was confronted with an
empirical conflict with the due diligence principle and the Declaration was
merely an extension of government’s behavior as a rational actor. India limited
its obligations vis-à-vis modifying religious practices only because it did not
want to offend median sensibilities, giving no indication on the epiphenomenal
nature of norms.
CONCLUSION
This Article argued that two historical moments in 1985 and 1987 created
an intersubjective reality that influenced the Indian government’s interpretation
of its CEDAW obligation. Then, it demonstrated that the behavior of the
government accords more with the rational choice theory of voting and elections
propounded by Anthony Downs than with any assumptions on the
epiphenomenal nature of norms. This confrontation is termed “historic” by this
Article because there is nothing new about this tension, and nothing that
exclusively privileges international law in capturing this conflict. Global gender
norms are not fundamentally different from domestic contexts. In the above case
study, they could be historically witnessed in India. The frame of the due
diligence principle is based on the material experiences of nations, implying that
the factors precluding compliance cannot be located in abstract assumptions of
international law but must be deeply contextual and based on the contingent
experiences of nations.
On the two previous historical moments, the Indian government preferred
the median voter’s position even when it was religious, male, patriarchal, and
firmly in favor of the religious attitudes that contribute to GBV. Then, it is
plausible to conclude that when India was confronted subsequently by a similar
empirical conflict in 1993 with the CEDAW and Article 5(a), which the due
diligence obligation normatively expanded to include a right to be free from
GBV, the Indian government issued a declaration protecting cultural traditions
based on its accurate intersubjective perception of its median voter.190 Hence,
190
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India’s Declaration to the CEDAW’s Article 5(a) emanates from the Indian
median voter’s attitude rather than any perception that norms are
epiphenomenal. The rational theory of voting perfectly explains the
manifestation of non-compliance. Theoretically, this implies that if the median
voter’s position undergoes a change through normative infusion of the feminist
ideals of emancipation, then this might force the Indian government to retract its
Declaration. Hence, the epiphenomenal contention does not permit the
restructuring of normative consciousness, on the basis of the right to genderbased equality, apart from incorrectly characterizing the nature of India’s
Declaration.
Further, on the basis of Roop’s case, this Article contends that the median
voter position influenced India’s Declaration to CEDAW’s Article 5(a). The
evidence indicates that the rational choice theory of voting and elections
influenced the government’s decision to issue a declaration located closer to the
median voter’s position regarding the conflict between the right to be free from
GBV and the right to freedom of religion. Though India has structured its
Reservation in terms of the laws of its minorities,191 the evidence on the above
two historical moments indicates that the Indian median position could be
characterized as Hindu, male, patriarchal, and firmly in favor of the religious
traditions that contribute to GBV. This implies that India’s Declaration
indirectly protects the majoritarian Hindu religious attitudes that are factors to
GBV despite being structured in terms of the Shari’a. Further, determining the
median voter position on the continuum between the right to be free from GBV
and the right to freedom of religion reveals India’s Declaration as an empirical
manifestation of the compliance deadlock over the Reservation to the CEDAW’s
due diligence principle. India has indirectly protected the cultural and patriarchal
practices emanating from religion, which is camouflaged by the language of the
Declaration itself.
Perhaps it may be argued that nations fear their electorates in implementing
the norm as is. This further implies that gender is not irrelevant to state interests
but very much material to it. If gender considerations can actually prevent
compliance because of a perception of the median voter position, then this also
refutes the contention of feminist IR theorists that gender is irrelevant to state
interests. Gender considerations materially affect the median voter and therefore
the government’s calculations.

191
8. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, INDIA, at
6, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-8.en.pdf.
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This Article contests the IR theorists’ view of gender oppression in
international relations as patriarchal and hegemonic. It seems that the IR
theorists’ view only partially explains the causes of non-compliance with the due
diligence principle. The more cogent explanation rests on a government’s
perception of its median voter. Postulating the causes of non-compliance in
terms of the median voter hypothesis also enables the conclusion that the median
preference is potentially variable and a new median could emerge as a result of
feminist activism. This principle requires testing across other geopolitical
regions where GBV is prevalent to determine its veracity. Further, postulation
of non-compliance in terms of patriarchal IR does not permit variation of this
preference. It remains fixed and static whereas, postulation in terms of the more
accurate median voter theorem enables variation in favor of a feminist solution.
Hence, the tools of mainstream political science are inherently necessary and
relevant to address GBV.
Roop was educated in an English-language school professing a connection
to liberal Enlightenment. Yet, this could not dispel the religious fervor
surrounding sati attesting to a need for a concerted force like the Government to
affirmatively re-create a modern, liberal, intersubjective reality that contests the
eschewing of the state by post-positivist feminist IR theorists.
The finding on the nature of the median voter as conservative, patriarchal,
and religious also counters the paradigmatic Hindu right-wing position that the
Hindu religion is somehow progressive than “retrogressive” Islam. The Hindu
right-wing political movement asserts that Hinduism possesses progressive
attitudes towards women because of the presence of codified Hindu laws, which
makes it more progressive than Islam.192 As a result, this argument is used to
foster Hindu-Muslim hatred in India which is simmering just below the surface.
The Partition of India into Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan and the Hindu
Muslim riots in the wake of the Babri Masjid Demolition are evidence of this
tension.193 Hence, the right-wing Hindu movement firmly believes in the
existence of a Hindu India solely on the basis of what it claims are progressive
gendered attitudes within Hinduism. However, feminists in India have
trenchantly called-out this false allegation by arguing that the Hindu religion is
in fact more potent towards women than the Sharia.194 This Article furthers this
192

Flavia Agnes, Hindu Men, Monogamy and Uniform Civil Code, 30 ECON. POLIT. WKLY. 3238, 3238

(1995).
193

PAUL R. BRASS, THE PRODUCTION

OF

HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE

IN

CONTEMPORARY INDIA 5–6

(2011).
194
Flavia Agnes, Women’s Movement within a Secular Framework: Redefining the Agenda, 29 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 19, 1123, 1125 (1994).
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feminist stand by demonstrating that the median voter in India is actually Hindu,
patriarchal, male and firmly in favor of the Hindu religious traditions that cause
GBV. Clearly, this finding implies that the Hindu religion does not possess
progressive atttidues on gender. If anything, it possesses the most retrogressive
of attitudes favoring GBV..195 The evidence clearly indicates that Hindu
traditions are retrogressive, ancient, backwards, and openly contribute to GBV.
Hence, the right-wing Hindutva allegations require restructuring prior to making
unsound allegations against the minority Islam.
Finally, this Article stands in testimony of the importance of appreciating
the intense sufferings that accompany GBV and demonstrates that such concern
helps illuminate international relations and rational choice theory of voting and
elections. This Article calls on scholars and researchers of all disciplines and
schools of thought to identify with the global movement condemning violence
against women and appreciate its relevance to all disciplines and walks of life,
and to fight for the total eradication of gender oppression from the hearts and
minds of the people who perpetrate it.

195

See id. at 1123.

